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COMMENTS
Choice-of-Law Questions in Cyberfraud
Richard H. Ackert
The first known choice-of-law rule dates back to around 119
B.C. Papyrus from a necropolis describes rules the Egyptians
established to clarify whose law to apply in trade disputes with
Greek merchants, with whom the Egyptians were beginning
active commerce.' Technology has advanced considerably since,
and choice-of-law principles have evolved as well; however, some
scholars feel that the latter have not kept pace with the former.2
The phenomenal growth of cyberspace' brings this issue into
sharp focus. Because it greatly facilitates interstate communica-
tion,' cyberspace enables millions of users5 in dozens of jurisdic-
tions to interact effortlessly; choice-of-law questions therefore will
arise with increasing frequency and complexity.
Cyberspace's lack of a fixed physical location may stretch
traditional choice-of-law rules to their limits and produce illogical
results that bear little relation to either party's interests.6 A
t BA. 1991, Brown University; M.P.A. 1994, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
' Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 7-8 (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1993).
' See, for example, Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort
Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 La L Rev 907, 920 (1994) (referring to the Constitution's grant of
federal common-law authority for maritime and admiralty cases, and the federal courts'
refusal to recognize a similar grant in airline cases).
' Some figures illuminate the rate of cyberspace's growth. The first bulletin-board
system was created in 1978, and sixteen years later there were at least 60,000. Edward A.
Cavazos and Gavino Morin, Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-
line World 10 (MIT Press, 1994). Similarly, the number of computers hooked directly to
the Internet grew from 727,000 in 1992 to over 1.3 million in 1993. Id. That number
increased to over 2.2 million by January 1994. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in
Cyberspace, Time 62 (Dec 6, 1993).
This analysis also applies to international communication, of course, but this Com-
ment will focus only on interstate questions.
See note 3.
6 One commentator notes, for example, that "[iun cyberspace, [ I the situs of the act
and actor may not be the same." Michael P. Dierks, Computer Network Abuse, 6 Harv J L
& Tech 307, 331 (1993). Because cyberspace allows the act to occur far away from the
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flexible approach to choice-of-law questions can reduce that
strain and allow courts to continue using conventional choice-of-
law methods without resorting to nontraditional solutions.
To demonstrate that possibility, this Comment explores a
hypothetical cyberfraud case affecting several states7 to demon-
strate the inadequacy of applying certain choice-of-law approach-
es in such a situation. By so doing, this Comment highlights the
need for flexibility in choice-of-law approaches, and shows how
the Restatement (Second) test meets that need better than any
other approach by allowing courts to maximize the satisfaction of
all interests involved. This Comment also discusses proposals
that would create a new law of cyberspace (and therefore elimi-
nate the need for choice-of-law analysis), but concludes that such
approaches are inappropriate and the Restatement (Second) test
remains the best alternative.
I. FRAUD LAW
"Fraud" is a generic term that describes the many ways a
party can lie or suppress the truth for personal gain.8 Typically,
a plaintiff claiming fraud must show that the defendant made a
false representation, knew its falsity, and intended the plaintiff
to rely upon the representation.9 The plaintiff must further dem-
onstrate that she thought the representation was true, relied on
its truth, and suffered injury thereby.1
While many jurisdictions incorporate most of these elements
into their common-law fraud actions, significant differences
actor (often in multiple jurisdictions), it may be subject to different laws than the actor is.
' This Comment uses "cyberfraud" as a convenient shorthand for "frauds committed
in (or via) cyberspace." Fraud cases often arise either in tort or in contract. For simplicity,
this Comment will only focus on common-law fraud as a tort. The elements for contract
fraud cases may be substantially similar to those for tort fraud. See, for example, Nodak
Oil Co. v Mobil Oil Corp., 391 F Supp 276, 280-81 (D ND 1975). Other factors may differ,
however. For example, the statute of limitations for fraud may differ from that for breach
of contract. See Randy E. Barnett and Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 Hofstra L Rev 443, 493-94
(1987).
Commonwealth v Smith, 46 SW2d 474, 478 (Ky Ct App 1932).
One of the most precise enumerations of fraud's elements states that they are: "(1)
A representation. (2) Its falsity. (3) Its materiality. (4) The speaker's knowledge of its
falsity or ignorance of its truth. (5) His intent that it should be acted on by the person and
in the manner reasonably contemplated. (6) The hearer's ignorance of the falsity. (7) His
reliance thereon. (8) His right to rely thereon. (9) And his consequent and proximate inju-
ry." 37 CJS Fraud § 3 (1943).
"0 See note 9.
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among states still exist."' For example, Wisconsin requires that
the defendant act intentionally in committing a fraud. 2 Nebras-
ka finds fraud where the defendant displays either knowledge or
recklessness. 3 North Dakota law allows a finding of fraud based
on mere negligence, 4 and Washington allows fraud convictions
on a strict liability basis. 5 Moreover, other factors affecting the
plaintiffs suit also may vary from one state to the next. For ex-
ample, statutes of limitations range from three years to six
" See notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
IS Loula v Snap-On Tools Corp., 175 Wis 2d 50, 498 NW2d 866, 868 (Ct App 1993)
("The elements of fraud require a false representation of fact made with intent to de-
fraud .. ").
Wisconsin also recognizes the tort of "misrepresentation" which is related to tortious
fraud. Ollerman v O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis 2d 17, 288 NW2d 95, 99 (1980). A plaintiff may
sue for strict-liability misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, or intentional
misrepresentation. Id. Intent is not an element for strict-liability or negligent misrepre-
sentation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated, however, that "fraudulent misrepre-
sentation" means intentional misrepresentation, id, so intent is apparently an element of
fraud.
13 Gibb v Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 246 Neb 355, 518 NW2d 910, 916 (1994) ("In order
to maintain an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must allege and
prove ... (3) that when made, the representation was known to be false or made reck-
lessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion. . . ," citing Nielsen v
Adams, 223 Neb 262, 388 NW2d 840, 846 (1986)). While Gibb holds that recklessness is
not sufficient for "fraudulent concealment," this Comment will focus on misrepresenta-
tions, not concealment.
" ND Cent Code § 9-10-02 (1993) states "[a] deceit [is] ... [t]he assertion as a fact of
that which is not true by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be
true ...." North Dakota courts use this statutory definition in tort cases. Delzer v United
Bank of Bismarck, 527 NW2d 650, 653 (ND 1995). North Dakota has a slightly different
definition of "fraud" in contract cases. ND Cent Code § 9-03-08 (1993). Although § 9-03-08
is entitled "fraud" and § 9-10-02 is entitled "deceit," non-contract fraud cases will fall
under § 9-10-02.
15 First Maryland Leasecorp v Rothstein, 72 Wash App 278, 864 P2d 17, 19 n 2 (1993)
("The nine essential elements of fraud are ... (4) the speaker's knowledge of [the
representation's] falsity or ignorance of the truth.. . ."). This definition of fraud has a
long pedigree in Washington dating back to 1934. Webster v L. Romano Engineering
Corp., 178 Wash 118, 34 P2d 428, 430 (1934); Sigman v Stevens-Norton Inc., 70 Wash 2d
915, 425 P2d 891, 895 (1967).
UnderFirst Maryland, liability lies even when the speaker's ignorance of the truth
is reasonable; therefore, the mens rea appears to be strict liability. A related line of cases
has confirmed the possibility of strict-liability fraud, holding that "[i]t makes no difference
whether the representations were made through mistake or with full knowledge of the
facts. Even though such representations were made through honest mistake they consti-
tute fraud in law." Western Lumber, Inc. v City of Aberdeen, 10 Wash App 325, 518 P2d
745, 746 (1973) (quoting Pratt v Thompson, 133 Wash 218, 233 P 637, 638 (1925)).
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years, 6 and the damages available to a plaintiff may differ
among states."
In the case of interstate fraud, therefore, many of the most
important questions will depend on which state's laws apply.
How the courts resolve this question will have significant reper-
cussions for the plaintiff, the defendant, and the states involved.
A hypothetical case highlights how the different rules could affect
the outcome in a cyberfraud case.
Expert, who lives in Wisconsin, dials from his home comput-
er to a newsgroup devoted to coin collectors. The newsgroup is
run out of the home of Operator, a collector living in Maryland.
While on the newsgroup, Expert meets Seller, a resident of west-
ern Vermont. Expert is a specialist in early colonial coinage, and
Seller asks Expert to identify a Vermont silver coin he found in
the attic of his old house. Seller says he is thinking of selling the
coin.
After looking at the high-resolution image Seller has scanned
and sent to him, Expert realizes he is unsure about this pattern.
Expert does have a book called Vermont Coinage, but, being too
tired to walk across the room and page through it, he relies on
" Some examples of varying statutes of limitations include the following jurisdictions
where fraud claims must be brought within three years: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
the District of Columbia, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Washington. See Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 12-543(3) (West 1992); Conn Gen Stat
Ann § 52-577 (West 1991); 10 Del Code Ann § 8106 (1974); DC Code §12-301(8) (1981); Md
Cts & Jud Proc Code Ann § 5-101 (1995); Miss Code § 15-1-29 (1972); NH Rev Stat Ann
§ 508:4(I) (Equity 1983 & Supp 1995); NC Gen Stat § 1-52(9) (1983); SC Code Ann § 15-3-
530(7) (Law Co-op 1976 & Supp 1995); and Wash Rev Code Ann § 4.16.080(4) (West
1988).
States where a fraud claim must be brought within four years include Florida,
Georgia, Nebraska, and New Mexico. See Fla Stat Ann § 95.11(3)(j) (West 1982); Ga Code
Ann § 9-3-31 (Michie 1982); Neb Rev Stat § 25-207(4) (1943); and NM Stat Ann § 37-1-4
(1978).
States where a fraud claim must be brought within five years include Illinois, Iowa,
and Kentucky. See Ill Ann Stat ch 735 § 5/13-205 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Iowa Code Ann
§ 614.1(4) (West 1950 & Supp 1995); and Ky Rev Stat Ann § 413.120(11) (Michie 1992).
States where a fraud claim must be brought within six years include Hawaii, Indi-
ana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. See Hawaii Rev Stat § 657-1(4) (1985); Ind Code Ann § 34-1-2-1 (West 1983);
14 Me Rev Stat Ann § 752 (West 1980); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.5813 (West 1987);
Minn Stat Ann § 541.05(6) (West 1988); NY Civ Prac L & R § 213(8) (McKinney 1990);
ND Cent Code § 28-01-16(6) (1991); SD Cod Laws § 15-2-13(6) (1984); 12 Vt Stat Ann
§ 511 (Equity 1973); and Wis Stat Ann § 893.93(1)(b) (West 1983).
Rhode Island allows ten years for a fraud claim to be brought. RI Gen Laws § 9-1-13
(1985).
" For example, North Dakota categorically refuses nominal damages in fraud cases,
while New Jersey allows them. Olson v Fraase 421 NW2d 820, 826 (ND 1988); Nappe v
Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 NJ 477, 37 A2d 1224, 1228-30 (1984).
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his (fallible) memory and tells Seller the coin "is a very common
issue from that period, worth about $5,000." Seller files away a
copy of the high-resolution image and Expert's reply.
The next day, acting on Expert's advice, Seller sells the coin
to Buyer, a collector living in Nebraska, for $6,500. Their agree-
ment took place on the newsgroup and was detailed enough to
constitute a legally-binding contract. Seller mails the coin from
the post office in Granville, New York, which happens to be clos-
er to his rural home than any Vermont post office.
Six months after the sale, Seller buys Vermont Coinage, but
it does not occur to him to look up the coin. A little over four
years after buying the book, Seller finally looks through it and
quickly identifies the coin in question, finding out that it was
actually quite uncommon and worth $80,000. Seller cannot locate
Buyer, and sues Expert in federal court in Burlington, Vermont,
for tortious fraud."8
In this fictional scenario, the federal court must choose
which state's laws to apply-Maryland's, Nebraska's, New York's,
Vermont's, or Wisconsin's. 9 If the court chooses to apply the law
of Maryland, where the newsgroup is "located," the court will
throw out Seller's claim due to Maryland's three-year statute of
limitations for fraud claims.2 ° This is because courts normally
start tolling the statute of limitations for fraud when the plaintiff
18 See note 7. Seller is limited to a tortious fraud claim because there is no contract
between him and Expert.
" It is possible for the court to use different states' laws on different issues-for
example, to use Wisconsin's law for the substantive elements of tortious fraud, and
Maryland's law for the statute of limitations. Such a splitting depends on whether the
court applies the same choice-of-law approach to each issue. Due to the large number of
permutations such splitting would cause, this Comment will not consider them.
20 Maryland's statute of limitations for tortious fraud is found in Md Cts & Jud Proc
Code Ann § 5-101 (1984). In jurisdictions where the statute of limitations is considered to
be a procedural matter, the forum state's statute of limitations will be applied. 54 CJS
Limitation of Actions § 28 (1987 and Supp 1995). Conversely, where the statute of limi-
tations is thought to be a substantive question, courts may apply the statute of limitations
of whichever state has the strongest interest or the most significant relationship. Id.
Vermont appears to fall into the first category. The Vermont Supreme Court ruled in
1969: "Statutes of limitation affect the remedy rather than the right. And this Court has
held that a cause of action which accrued in a foreign jurisdiction could not be maintained
here after the time limited in our statute had expired." Jacques v Jacques, 128 Vt 140,
259 A2d 779, 780 (1969). Nonetheless, this rule might change if Vermont reconsiders its
choice-of-law rule, as has been predicted. See note 29. Many states that adopt the Restate-
ment (Second) approach (see notes 85-115 and accompanying text) also use the signifi-
cant-relations test for choosing statutes of limitation. 54 CJS Limitation of Actions § 28.
At any rate, in the interest of showing how statutes of limitation can affect outcomes, this
Comment will contrafactually hypothesize that the Federal court in Vermont may indeed
take foreign statutes of limitation into account.
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reasonably should have discovered the damage;2' under the hy-
pothetical, this occurred when Seller bought Vermont Coinage but
failed to consult it. His claim would also fail under the four-year
statute of limitations for fraud in Nebraska, where Buyer took
possession.2 Furthermore, if the court applies the law of Wis-
consin, where Expert made the allegedly tortious statement,
Seller also would lose: Wisconsin requires the defendant to have
acted intentionally, and Expert appears only to have been reck-
less.23 Nor would Seller prevail in New York, where he relin-
quished possession of the coin to the mails, because that state
requires knowledge or intent for a fraud action to succeed.24
Indeed, Seller can succeed only if the court applies the law of
his home state, Vermont. In Vermont, a plaintiff has six years to
file a fraud claim 5 and need not show knowledge or intent on
the part of the defendant.26
21 See, for example, Hecht v Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md 324, 635 A2d 394, 399
(1994); Jameson v Graham, 159 Neb 202, 66 NW2d 417, 419 (1954); Bader v Fleschner,
463 F Supp 976, 981 (SD NY 1978); Estate of Delligan, 111 Vt 227, 13 A2d 282, 287-88
(1940); Stroh Die Casting Co. v Monsanto Co., 177 Wis 2d 91, 502 NW2d 132, 135-37 (Ct
App 1993).
22 Neb Rev Stat § 25-207(4) (1985).
22 Loula, 498 NW2d at 868. There would be evidentiary problems for Seller. Nonethe-
less, given Expert's specialized knowledge in the area, his wrong answer on a relatively
easy question may be enough to show negligence or recklessness.
24 New York requires scienter for a fraud action. Graubard Mollen Dannett &
Horowitz v Moskovitz, 86 NY2d 112, 653 NE2d 1179, 1184 (1995) ("A cause of action for
fraud may arise when one misrepresents a material fact, knowing it is false ....").
Requiring scienter in fraud is supported by a long line of New York cases dating as far
back as 1917. Ochs v Woods, 221 NY 335, 117 NE 305, 306 (1917); Hanlon v MacFadden
Publications, Inc., 302 NY 502, 99 NE2d 546, 549 (1951); Channel Master Corp. v Alumi-
num Ltd. Sales, 176 NYS2d 259, 151 NE2d 833, 835 (1958). While "scienter" connotes a
mens rea of knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary 1345 (West, 6th ed 1990), federal courts sit-
ting in New York have preferred to require intent. Keywell Corp. v Weinstein, 33 F3d 159,
163 (2d Cir 1994); Katara v D. E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F2d 966, 970-71 (2d Cir
1987).
2512 Vt Stat Ann § 511.
26 At first blush, Vermont cases appear to require intent or knowledge for a fraud
claim to lie. Lewis v Cohen, 157 Vt 564, 603 A2d 352, 354 (1991) ("An action for fraud and
deceit will lie upon an intentional misrepresentation ... so long as the misrepresentation
was.., known to be false by the maker ... ," quoting Union Bank v Jones, 138 Vt 505,
411 A2d 1338, 1342 (1980)).
Further examination shows, however, that knowledge or intent may be imputed
where the defendant carelessly passes off as fact what is really just opinion: "A represen-
tation of a fact, as of the party's own knowledge, if it prove false, is ... inferred to be
wilfully false and made with an intent to deceive ..... Cunningham v Miller, 150 Vt 263,
552 A2d 1203, 1204 (1988) (citing the "leading case" of Cabot v Christie, 42 Vt 121, 126
(1869) (emphasis in original)). Again, "[I]ntentional [sic] passing off belief for knowledge
[is] of the same quality as conscious misstatement of facts and furnish[es] the element of
knowledge required to make the false representation fraudulent." Cunningham, 552 A2d
CHOICE OF LAW IN CYBERFRAUD
II. CURRENT CHOICE-OF-LAW DOCTRINE
It seems clear, therefore, that the court's decision about
which state's law to apply will make enormous differences to the
parties. Following the Erie doctrine,27 a federal court must apply
the choice-of-law rule of the state in which it sits." In this hypo-
thetical, because the suit was filed in Vermont, the court must
follow Vermont's choice-of-law approach.
A. Restatement (First): Lex Loci Delicti
1. The law.
Vermont follows the traditional choice-of-law rule, known as
lex loci delicti: the law of the place of the wrong controls.29 This
approach, also embodied in the Restatement (First) of the Con-
flict of Laws,3" rests on respect for states' territorial sanctity;
states may apply their own laws to activities within their bor-
ders.31 This approach is also lauded for providing "certainty, uni-
formity, and predictability of outcome"32 because it avoids the
complex and unpredictable multi-factor analysis that typifies
competing approaches.33
The difficulty, highlighted by the hypothetical, is that an act
may occur "in" several states. Anticipating this problem, the Re-
statement (First) of the Conflict of Laws states, "[t]he place of
wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an
at 1205 (quoting Smith v Badlam, 112 Vt 143, 22 A2d 161, 162 (1941)). The Cabot rule
essentially means that incorrect opinions passed off as fact fulfill the "knowledge" require-
ment for fraud, even if they were only negligently or recklessly made. Consequently, for
the purposes of this Comment's hypothetical scenario, Vermont does not require knowl-
edge or intent (in the normal senses of the words) to find fraud.
2' Erie R.R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938). Erie applies because Seller's suit
is in federal court solely due to diversity jurisdiction.
Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Manufacturing, 313 US 487, 496 (1941).
Black's Law Dictionary 911 (West, 6th ed 1990).
Vermont has hinted that it may be ready to abandon the lex loci approach in favor of
the Restatement (Second) (see notes 75-93 and accompanying text), but has not yet had
occasion to reconsider it. Calhoun v Blakely, 152 Vt 113, 564 A2d 590, 592 n 2 (i989). The
federal court sitting in Vermont continues to predict that Vermont will switch to Restate-
ment (Second). Nordica USA, Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, 839 F Supp 1082, 1086 (D Vt
1993).
3 Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).
Travelers Indemity Co. v Lake, 594 A2d 38, 44 (Del 1991) (overruling lex loci but
nonetheless explaining its foundational underpinnings). The Restatement (First) of the
Conflict of Laws confirms this, noting that "[e]ach state has legislative jurisdiction to
determine the legal effect of acts done or events caused within its territory." Restatement
(First) of the Conflict of Laws § 377 comment a.
32 Boudreau v Baughman, 322 NC 331, 368 SE2d 849, 854 (1988).
See notes 57-115 and accompanying text.
4371
444 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."34 To illustrate what
constitutes a "last event," the Restatement sketches several ex-
amples. If A, standing in Idaho, shoots B, standing in Montana,
Montana becomes the "place of wrong" because that is where the
"force impinged upon his body."35 By the same logic, if A's facto-
ry in Idaho emits sulfur dioxide which kills B's trees in Montana,
the latter represents the place of wrong because that is where
"the force takes effect on the thing."
36
This emphasis on the end result carries over into fraud cases
as well. The Restatement (First) states that, in fraud cases, "the
place of wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where fraudu-
lent representations are made."37 This rule makes sense because
common-law fraud does not become actionable unless some proxi-
mate loss (usually financial) results.38 Since it necessarily occurs
after the fraudulent misrepresentation that induced it, the loss
normally will constitute the "last event necessary" to make the
defendant liable. For example: if A, from her home in Idaho,
writes B, in Montana, a letter containing fraudulent statements
that induce B to send A money, the "place of wrong" is Montana,
where B parted with the money.39 In such tort cases, the court
simply must determine where the plaintiff sustained a loss.
2. Application and commentary.
Applying the rule of lex loci to the hypothetical appears easy
at first blush. All five states involved agree that a plaintiff must
suffer some sort of damage or injury before an action for fraud
will lie,4° so the "last event" occurred when Seller sold the coin
'4 Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws § 377 (emphasis added).
Based on id at illus 1.
36 Based on id at illus 4.
3' Id at n 4.
See notes 9 and 39.
Based on Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws § 377 illus 5.
40 Maryland law states that "[i]n order to recover damages in an action for fraud or
deceit, a plaintiff must prove... (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury re-
sulting from the misrepresentation." Ellerin v Fairfax Savings, 337 Md 216, 652 A2d
1117, 1123 (Ct App 1995) (quoting Nails v S & R, Inc., 334 Md 398, 639 A2d 660, 668-69
(Ct App 1994)).
Nebraska law states that "[t]o recover in an action for fraud ... the plaintiff must
prove that ... (6) as the result of such reliance, the plaintiff suffered damage." Henderson
v Forman, 240 Neb 939, 486 NW2d 182, 186 (1992) (quoting Broekemeier Ford v
Clatanoff, 240 Neb 265, 481 NW2d 416, 420 (1992)).
New York law states that "[tihe essential elements of the injured party's cause of ac-
tion [for fraud]... [include] 'injury.'" Miltland Raleigh-Durham v Myers, 807 F Supp
1025, 1057 (SD NY 1992) (quoting DiRose v PK Management Corp., 691 F2d 628, 630 (2d
Cir 1982)).
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for $73,500 less than it was worth.41 Therefore, the court would
probably analyze the hypothetical much as in the last example.
In that example, where B mailed money to A, the "place of
loss" meant where B relinquished possession of the goods to the
postal service. Under similar reasoning, New York's law would
apply in this Comment's hypothetical because Seller dropped the
coin off at the post office in that state.
While the preceding analogy has certain flaws,42 the Ver-
mont court might well apply it under a lex loci rule. Assuming
New York is indeed the lex loci, Seller cannot successfully sue
Expert: even though the action satisfies the five-year statute of
Vermont law states that "[to support an action for fraud or deceit, the representa-
tions must be ... relied upon by [the plaintiff)... to his damage." Fayette v Ford Motor
Credit Co., 129 Vt 505, 282 A2d 840, 843 (1971) (quoting Anderson v Knapp, 126 Vt 129,
225 A2d 72, 76 (1966)).
Wisconsin law states that "[t]o be actionable the false representation must... [have
been relied on by the other party] to his injury or damage." First Credit Corp. v Myricks,
41 Wis 2d 146, 163 NW2d 1, 3 (1968) (quoting Int'l Milling Co. v Priem, 179 Wis 622, 192
NW 68, 70 (1923)).
"' One could make a plausible argument that the critical moment really is when
Buyer and Seller formed their contract on the newsgroup. For a more detailed discussion
of that scenario, see note 42.
42 The weakness is that, in the hypothetical, Buyer and Seller were in some sense
"in" Maryland when they struck the deal together on the newsgroup; there is no analo-
gous center to the A-B postal relationship. One could argue that the real loss occurred
when the deal was made and Seller therefore became legally bound, all of which hap-
pened "in" Maryland. In such a case, a contract approach would be more appropriate.
In fact, in Bailey v Chattem, Inc., 684 F2d 386, 393 (6th Cir 1982), the court (apply-
ing Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws § 377 n 4) found that the place where the
loss was sustained was where the plaintiff "relied on [the defendant's] misrepresentation
to his detriment by assigning his patent rights [to the. defendant]." Emphasis added. If
making an enforceable agreement to deliver a coin to Buyer is analogous to assigning the
coin to Buyer, then a strong case exists for saying the loss was sustained in Maryland, not
New York. This would be to Expert's advantage, because Maryland's three-year statute of
limitations for fraud would bar Seller's claim (see note 16). This ambiguity is reflected in
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which tries to elucidate where the "place of
loss" is in such a case: ". . . the place of loss may be considered to be either the place
where the plaintiff entered into the contract or the place where he relinquished the as-
sets... ."Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 comment c (1971). Therefore, at
least two answers seem possible: where Seller relinquished the coin (New York), or where
he entered into the contract with Buyer (Maryland).
Four answers become possible if we explore the contract analogy further. If the court
rejects the contention that Seller and Buyer entered into the contract in Maryland, then
they must have formed their contract either in Vermont (where Seller received Buyer's
acceptance) or in Nebraska (where Buyer dispatched the acceptance). Expert would win
under Nebraska's laws and lose under Vermont's, (see notes 22-26 and accompanying
text). Either way, a new set of laws could come in to the picture.
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limitations,' New York requires knowledge or intent for a fraud
action to lie."
This result appears unjust. It seems unfair to deny Seller
recovery simply for choosing the wrong post office. Although
Expert had no intent to cheat Seller,45 his advice was certainly
negligent, perhaps reckless, and cost Seller $73,500. To make
matters worse, Seller probably could maintain a fraud action
under Vermont law, which does not require knowledge or intent
on the part of defendant46 and which provides a generous stat-
ute of limitations (six years).47 Moreover, lex loci's supposed ad-
vantage of predictability fails to materialize for Seller, who would
never suspect that an incidental state's rule would control the
case. For Expert, the result appears even less foreseeable.48
To an extent, party expectations usually will suffer in
cyberfraud cases. Users often remain unaware of the physical
locations of the Internet addresses they visit49 and may know
even less about the residency of their fellow sojourners in
cyberspace. ° Contrast this situation with the society for which
the lex loci rule developed:
When the doctrine of lex loci delicti was first estab-
lished in the mid-nineteenth century, . . . people only
occasionally crossed state boundaries. Under those cir-
cumstances, there was legitimacy in a rule which pre-
sumed that persons changing jurisdictions would be
NY Civ Prac Laws & Rules § 213(8) (McKinney 1990).
" See note 24.
Expert gained nothing from the incident and probably stands to lose a great deal.
Cunningham v Miller, 150 Vt 263, 552 A2d 1203, 1204-05 (1988).
41 12 Vt Stat Ann § 511 (Equity 1973).
'- If the court were to apply Maryland's law (see note 42) then that would be even
less predictable-neither party would have expected Maryland law to apply, and they may
not even have known the newsgroup was located in Maryland. This depends, however, on
certain factual variables-for example, if Seller and Expert had to program in the
newsgroup's phone number, they would know its area code and hence its state. That is
not usually necessary for newsgroups, however. As with World Wide Web sites, the
computer finds the location without requiring the user to pinpoint a particular phone
number. On the other hand, if the hypothetical took place on a dial-in, bulletin-board sys-
tem, Seller and Expert would have had better notice because that normally requires
entering the relevant phone number.
Assuming the users did not know the newsgroup's location, Vermont is probably the
most "foreseeable" of any state in the hypothetical. It would have been foreseeable to
Seller, since he lives there, and possibly to Expert too, since it was a Vermont coin
(though this is debatable).
, See note 48.
Even if a user knows the location of an Internet address, that does not mean she
knows the location of the other visitors at that site.
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aware of the different duties and obligations they were
incurring when they made the interstate journey."
Much of the activity that takes place in modern society does
not fit this description; cyberspace represents an even greater
departure from this conception because of the many activities
that take one into foreign jurisdictions with no notice thereof.52
In fact, the lex loci rule has declined steadily in popularity:
in 1983, twenty-one states applied lex loci.5 3 By the beginning of
1994, only, thirteen states followed it.5' This stems partly from
the shortcomings the hypothetical points out: the lex loci rule
developed, when Americans, being less mobile, almost certainly
knew when they were engaging in interstate dealings.55 Invok-
ing lex loci in cyberfraud cases has the opposite effect; it exposes
parties to potentially harsh fraud standards in states with which
they did not know they had any contacts.5" This rule, therefore,
can lead to unpredictable and unjust results in cyberfraud cases.
5, First Natl Bank in Fort Collins v Rostek, 182 Colo 437, 514 P2d 314, 316 (1973).
52 See note 48.
Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 Mercer L
Rev 521, 586 n 399, 591-92 (1983).
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993 (and in the
Six Previous Years), 42 Am J Comp L 599, 606 (1994); updated by Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1994: A View 'From the Trenches", 43 Am J
Comp L 1 (1995). These states include Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. See Fitts v Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 581 S2d 819, 823 (Ala 1991); Risdon
Enterprises v Colemill Enterprises, 172 Ga App 902, 324 SE2d 738, 740 (1984); Ling v
Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan 629, 703 P2d 731, 735 (1985); Hauch v Connor, 295 Md 120, 453
A2d 1207, 1209 (1983); Lewis v Reader's Digest Assn, 162 Mont 401, 512 P2d 702, 705
(1973); Karlsen v Jack, 80 Nev 201, 391 P2d 319, 320 (1964); First Natl Bank in Albuquer-
que v Benson, 89 NM 481, 553 P2d 1288 (Ct App 1976); Boudreau v Baughman, 322 NC
331, 368 SE2d 849, 854 (1988); Oshiek v Oshiek, 136 SE2d 303, 305 (SC 1964); Goldman v
Beaudry, 122 Vt 299, 170 A2d 636, 638 (1961); McMillan v McMillan, 219 Va 1127, 253
SE2d 662, 663 (1979); Paul v National Life, 177 WVa 427, 352 SE2d 550, 555-56 (1986);
Ball v Ball, 73 Wyo 29, 269 P2d 302, 304 (1954).
Nevada may have abandoned lex loci; its Supreme Court declared in Hermanson v
Hermanson, 1994 WL 713121 (Nev 1994) that "[this court has adopted the substantial re-
lationship test to resolve conflict of law questions." Id at *2 (citing Sievers v Diversified
Mortgage Investors, 95 Nev 811, 603 P2d 270 (1979)). But Sievers was a contractual
choice-of-law case, so it is not clear whether Hermanson only applies to contractual choice-
of-law, or whether its broad language also sweeps in tort choice-of-law.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law ch 7 at 413 (1971) (Introductory Note).
Note that this problem also exists for defendants. If Seller had been able to sue
under New York law, Expert would be unexpectedly subject to the fraud law of a state
with which he never knew he had any contact.
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B. Lex Fori
1. The law.
For states following a lex fori philosophy, the analysis is
extremely simple-the forum state's law applies. Such an ap-
proach offers predictability as its main advantage; once jurisdic-
tion and venue problems are resolved, no choice-of-law questions
remain. 7 By- its nature, the lex fori rule applies easily, and judg-
es need not attempt to interpret the laws of states with which
they have no familiarity.
The disadvantage, of course, lies in the rule's arbitrariness: a
plaintiff could easily forum shop and know with certainty that
her efforts would succeed. It remains unclear whether this ap-
proach would promote or discourage judicial efficiency. On the
one hand, parties would spend less time in court arguing choice-
of-law questions; on the other hand, the plaintiff would spend
more time seeking a favorable forum. Potential equity concerns
also arise, as the plaintiff could more easily seek a state with
laws that disadvantage the defendant. Furthermore, the lex fori
method may seriously disserve the policies and interests of the
various states involved because it gives these considerations no
weight.
No states formally admit to following a lex fori approach, but
scholars argue that Michigan and Kentucky "follow a sufficiently
blatant form of forum favoritism in tort conflicts" to qualify them
as lex fori states.58
2. Application and commentary.
If the Vermont court in the hypothetical followed lex fori, it
would apply its own law. As noted earlier, this would probably
allow Seller to prevail.59 In one sense, this result seems
just-applying Vermont laws allows the injured party to recover,
more nearly fits Seller's expectations, and does not wholly violate
For an analysis of jurisdictional questions see Comment, Bulletin Board Systems
and Personal Jurisdiction: What Comports with Fairplay and Substantial Justice?, 1996 U
Chi Legal F 519.
' Symeonides, 42 Am J Comp L at 611 (cited in note 54); updated by Symeonides 43
Am J Comp L 1 (cited in note 54). The Tennessee Supreme Court has also noted a de
facto lex fori regime in Michigan and Kentucky. See Hataway v McKinley, 830 SW2d 53,
59 (Tenn 1992). Both Symeonides and Hataway cite Foster v Leggett, 484 SW2d 827, 829
(Ky 1972) (applying the law of the forum state if that state has "enough" contacts), and
Olmstead v Anderson, 428 Mich 1, 400 NW2d 292, 302 (1987) (applying lex fori unless
another state has a more significant interest).
I " See notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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Expert's expectations." While it runs against Wisconsin's policy
of protecting its citizens from prosecution for unintentional fraud,
it serves Vermont's interest in protecting its citizens from fraudu-
lent activity.6"
If this approach reaches the right result, however, it does so
for the wrong reasons. The test makes no attempt to fulfill the
parties' expectations, does not try to balance state interests, and
does not seek the more just or efficient solution;62 any positive
results are largely coincidental. A slight change in the hypotheti-
cal demonstrates this. Assume Seller actually lived in Wisconsin
and found the coin while visiting his brother in Vermont. Seller
bought Vermont Coinage and discovered Expert's error while still
living in Wisconsin, but was planning to move to Vermont within
a year. Seller does some legal research and perceives an advan-
tage in waiting to sue until he arrives in Vermont, which he in
fact does. Under this scenario, rote application of lex fori would
defeat Wisconsin's arguably greater interests and more signifi-
cant relation to the case. 3
C. Governmental Interest Analysis
1. The law.
Lex fori has not been seriously considered by most states in
recent years," and the lex loci approach drew sharp criticism
o See notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
61 These interests attributed to Vermont and Wisconsin are presumed from their
respective strict-liability and intent-based fraud laws (see notes 12 and 26 and accompa-
nying text).
' It is not clear there is any generally efficient solution. In the coin hypothetical,
Expert and Seller are both low cost avoiders: Expert could easily have researched Seller's
inquiry more carefully or worded his response less assuredly, and Seller could easily have
sought a second opinion or (six months later) looked in Vermont Coinage and contacted
Buyer before Buyer vanished. Similarly, in cyberfraud cases generally, who the best cost
avoider is will depend heavily on the facts.
Furthermore, even if one party were consistently the best cost avoider, no choice-of-
law approach can guarantee that that party would bear the burden. Choice-of-law rules
depend on factors (such as where the parties reside, where the "last act" occurred, and the
interest of the states involved) that themselves are only tangentially related to cost avoid-
ance.
' Wisconsin would have a greater interest because both parties lived there at the
time of the sale, the misrepresentation was both made and received in Wisconsin, Seller
relinquished possession of the coin to the mails in Wisconsin, and the contract between
Seller and Buyer might have been made in Wisconsin (but see note 42).
'4 Lex fori was a predominant approach through early American history, however.
Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 89 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1993) (cited in note 1).
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almost from inception.65 These developments inspired legal
scholars to develop better choice-of-law methods, and the first
major contribution came from Professor Brainerd Currie.66
Currie developed his proposal, often called "governmental
interest analysis," in response to the rigid lex loci rule. 7 Under
governmental interest analysis, the court must consider the poli-
cies behind the state laws relevant to the case at hand and then
determine which state's laws would best advance those policies.
Currie viewed choice-of-law rules primarily as a tool for imple-
menting state policy,68 but he believed that other legitimate fac-
tors could influence the outcome indirectly. For example, he felt
that the substantive state laws in question already would incor-
porate private interests and expectations,69 leaving no need for
the courts to weigh such factors independently. After weighing
the states' interests, the court would determine if a "true conflict"
existed-whether two or more states have legitimate interests in
their laws being applied.7 ° In "true conflict" cases, the court
would apply lex fori.1
2. Application and commentary.
If the Vermont court in the hypothetical followed this govern-
mental interest analysis, it probably would apply Vermont law.
Several states have legitimate interests to advance: Wisconsin
seeks to protect its citizens from being prosecuted for uninten-
Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U Pa L
Rev 949, 953 (1994).
" See notes 67-71. This is not to imply that other scholars did not make significant con-
tributions as well. See Juenger, Chokce of Law at 92-98 (cited in note 1). Currie's contribu-
tion, however, is considered a watershed in choice-of-law law.
67 Professor Currie's principal writings on the subject include Brainerd Currie, On the
Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 Colum L Rev 964, 967 (1958); and Brainerd
Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U Chi L Rev 9 (1958) (explaining the theory behind governmental interest
analysis).
" Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
Duke L J 171, 173-74.
' Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws,
28 U Chi L Rev 258, 280-84 (1961).
70 Comment, Let the Chips Fall Where They May, 26 UC Davis L Rev at 1059-60
(1993). If only one state had a true policy interest, then there is a "false conflict" and the
interested state's law applies over the disinterested state's law. Id at 1058-59.
71 Currie advocated this lex fori default rule "simply because a court should never ap-
ply any other law except when there is a good reason for doing so." Brainerd Currie,
Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U Chi L Rev 227, 261
(1958).
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tional fraud, Vermont seeks to give its citizens a means of recov=
ering for fraudulent acts, New York and Nebraska have an inter-
est in not allowing parties to use their mails for fraudulent activ-
ities, and Maryland has a similar concern regarding its telephone
lines. The first two interests probably have the strongest claim.
In any event, a "true conflict" exists and therefore the court must
therefore revert to lex fori.
This final step, which incorporates a default lex fori rule, has
received heavy criticism.72 Identifying the conflict of state in-
terests does not normally pose difficulty. Instead, the problem
arises when a court must resolve this conflict.7" Reflexively ap-
plying the law of the forum state may ignore the relative merits
of the states' policies, give no weight to the concerns of the par-
ties, frustrate justified expectations, fail to consider the needs of
interstate commerce, and leave unaddressed the problem of pre-
dictability. Problems also inhere in an attempt to discern the
policies behind a state's law: legislatures do not always have a
clear-cut goal in mind when enacting a certain rule, or their goal
may not appear clearly in the text or the legislative history.74
The court may be divining a fiction when engaging in governmen-
tal interest analysis.
Applying Vermont law seems the best result under the hypo-
thetical. Yet governmental interest analysis, like lex fori, seems
to reach this right result for the wrong reason.75 Automatic de-
fault to the forum state whenever a conflict arises seems no bet-
ter than lex loci.7" These criticisms help explain why only three
jurisdictions follow the governmental interest analysis.77
72 See, for example, Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative In-
tent, 78 Mich L Rev 392 (1980); and Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of In-
terest Analysis, 32 Am J Comp L 1 (1984).
"3 Hataway, 830 SW2d at 58 (citing Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United
States, 38 Hastings L J 1041, 1048 (1987)).
"' See, for example, McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 Georgetown L J 705, 710-12 (1992) (noting that legislation
rarely embodies the ideals of its supporters because compromises must be made to ensure
passage, sometimes resulting in the inclusion of contradictory goals).
" For a spirited defense of interest analysis, see Bruce Posnak, Choice of
Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get It, 40 Wayne L Rev 1121 (1994).
"' One could easily imagine additional scenarios in which the forum state is largely
peripheral. For example, if Seller flew to Wisconsin on a business trip and sold the coin
while there, it would begin to look like Wisconsin law should control. Under the govern-
mental interest analysis, however, the Vermont and Wisconsin interests would cancel just
as before, and Vermont's law would prevail simply because Seller happened to bring the
suit there.
"' Symeonides, 42. .J Comp L at 611 (cited in note 54); updated by Symeonides, 43
Am J Comp L 1 (cited in note 54). The three jurisdictions are California, the District of
4371
452 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
D. Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations
1. The law.
Another approach, known as "choice-influencing consider-
ations," was advanced by Professor Robert Leflar shortly after
Currie offered his governmental interest analysis.78 Leflar pro-
posed that courts consider five criteria when making choice-of-
law decisions: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of
interstate and international order; (3) simplification of the judi-
cial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
and (5) application of the better rule of law.79 One aspect of
Leflar's method that distinguishes it from governmental interest
analysis lies in the breadth of interests it recognizes. Instead of
focusing on only one actor-the state-Leflar attempts to address
the needs of the interstate system, the judicial system, and the
community of law. In that respect, his approach avoids some of
the pitfalls of Currie's interest analysis" and thus has proved
more popular with the states: five jurisdictions follow Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations.8'
Nonetheless, Leflar's approach has suffered criticism for
favoring the forum state.82 While the first two criteria do not
seem to favor the forum state, the final three criteria do. Choos-
ing the forum state's law offers the clearest way to simplify the
judicial task and advance the forum state's interest. Concerning
the fifth criterion, judges seldom consider their state's laws infe-
rior to those of other states. 3 This approach therefore presents
the same lex fori concerns as noted earlier, including forum shop-
ping, potential inequities, and failure to weigh the interests of
Columbia, and New Jersey. See Bernhard v Harrah's Club, 16 Cal 3d 313, 546 P2d 719,
720-21 (1976); Rong Yao Zhou v Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A2d 1268, 1270 (DC
App 1987); Mellk v Sarahson, 49 NJ 226, 229 A2d 625, 626-27 (1967).
" Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 NYU L
Rev 267 (1966).
7' Id at 282.
80 See notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
" Symeonides, 42 Am J Comp L at 611 (cited in note 54); updated by Symeonides, 43
Am J Comp L 1 (cited in note 54). The five states following the Leflar "choice-influencing
considerations" test consist of Arkansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. See Wallis v Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark 622, 550 SW2d 453, 456-57 (1977)
(emphasizing governmental interest and the better choice of law); Bigelow v Halloran, 313
NW2d 10, 12 (Minn 1981) (emphasizing (in tort cases) governmental interest and the
better choice of law); Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 222 A2d 205, 208-09 (1966); Woodward v
Stewart, 104 RI 290, 243 A2d 917, 923 (1968); Hunker v Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis 2d 588,
204 NW2d 897, 902-03 (1973).
82 Smith, Choice of Law, 38 Hastings L J at 1049 (cited in note 73).
Id.
CHOICE OF LAW IN CYBERFRAUD
non-forum states."
2. Application and commentary.
Under Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, the court
would probably opt for Vermont's law. Once again, the right
result appears to emerge for the wrong reason-excessive favorit-
ism of the forum state's law. Applying the forum state's law could
well lead to inappropriate results such as those noted immediate-
ly above. Like the approaches of lex loci, lex fori, and governmen-
tal interest analysis, Leflar's choice-influencing considerations
seem too rigid to handle the complex scenarios that cyberspace
interactions might introduce.
E. Restatement (Second): Most Significant Relationship
1. The law.
If Vermont followed the majority rule instead, it would apply
the "most significant relationship" test for torts embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.8" That test directs
courts adjudicating tort cases to use the law of the state where
the injury occurred unless another state has a more significant
relationship to the case."6 Consequently, the law of the state
that has the "most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties" will control.87 To determine which state has the
most significant relationship, the court must consider where the
injury occurred, where the injury-causing conduct occurred,
where the parties live, and where their relationship is "cen-
tered.""8
This Restatement's Section 148 deals more specifically with
questions of fraud.89 Under Section 148, the court must consider
where the plaintiff relied on the defendant's representations,
where the plaintiff received the representations, where the defen-
dant made them, and where they each live.9° In addition, the
See notes 57-63 and 72-77 and accompanying text.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).
Id § 145(1).
87 Id.
88 Id § 145(2).
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 (1971).
Id § 148(2Xa)-(d). This section also includes two other factors to consider which are
not relevant to this hypothetical: where an object that was the subject of a transaction
between the plaintiff and defendant is located, and where the plaintiff is supposed to
perform her part of a contract that the defendant induced her to enter by fraud. Id
§ 148(2)(e)-(f). Since there is no transaction or contract between Seller and Expert, this
Comment does not consider either factor.
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Restatement's Section Six instructs the court to consider broader
choice-of-law concerns:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international sys-
tems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law
to be applied.91
These criteria underlie all of the Restatement (Second) approach-
es, and any analysis of Sections 145 and 148 must occur with
these Section Six factors in mind.
2. Application and commentary.
In the hypothetical, applying Section 145 alone remains
inconclusive because no state clearly has a more significant rela-
tionship than any other.2 The injury occurred either in Ver-
mont, where Seller was misled; in New York, where he mailed
the coin; in Maryland, where he and Buyer were "present" when
making the contract; or in all three.9" The injury-causing con-
duct occurred in Wisconsin. The parties live in Vermont and
Wisconsin. The newsgroup in Maryland represents the "center," if
any, of their relationship.
Vermont, however, becomes the likely choice under Section
148. Seller acted in reliance either in Vermont, Maryland, or
New York.9 4 Seller received the representations in Vermont. Ex-
pert made the representations in Wisconsin. The two parties live
in Wisconsin and Vermont. The question of where the relation-
ship is "centered" is omitted from Section 148, so Maryland's role
diminishes. The Restatement (Second) also instructs that, in
fraud cases, the defendant's home is not as important as the
d I §6.
92 Under the § 145 analysis, Nebraska appears to have no significant relationship. Id
§ 145.
" See note 42.
9 See note 42.
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plaintiffs home,95 so Wisconsin's interest also diminishes. Fur-
thermore, this test emphasizes "significant relationships" and
contacts,98 so New York probably drops out of consideration due
to its peripheral role.
Section Six factors muddy the waters in the hypothetical.97
The Restatement (Second) states that "[p]robably the most impor-
tant function of choice-of-law rules" is to ensure the interstate
system's smooth functioning,98 but this does not clearly favor
any state. Choosing Vermont law in the hypothetical could have
a chilling effect on interstate communications in cyberspace. The
very real risk of unwittingly becoming subject to the laws of any
state, without warning, could easily deter users like Expert. On
the other hand, choosing Wisconsin's law could send a message to
cyberfraud victims that they may have no remedy if the perpetra-
tor operates in a pro-defendant state.9 While such an outcome
would not deter users from exploring cyberspace, it could discour-
age them from relying on agreements or statements made there.
This would ultimately be to the detriment of cyberspace as an
interstate marketplace or public forum, thus failing Section Six's
emphasis on the interstate system. Choosing New York or Ne-
braska law in this scenario also could have a chilling effect on
the interstate system, because such a choice would make
cyberspace voyagers fear being unpredictably haled into court in
states that were quite incidental to an Internet communication.
Choosing Maryland law could have the same chilling effect as
that noted for Vermont: users would become worried about where
the computers they visit in cyberspace are "really" located, and
avoid certain addresses for fear of subjecting themselves to cer-
tain states' laws.
'5 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 comment i.
See, for example, the discussion in id at comment b.
" This may not be surprising in the case of torts. The Restatement (Second) notes
that in the law of torts, the "difficulties and complexities ... have ... prevented the
courts from formulating a precise rule, or series of rules, which provide a satisfactory
accommodation of the underlying factors.. . ." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§ 6 comment c.
98 Id at comment d.
Seller could not recover under Wisconsin law because it requires the defendant to
intend fraud; recklessness does not suffice. Loula v Snap-On Tools Corp., 175 Wis 2d 50,
498 NW2d 866, 868 (Ct App 1993). The claim would also be barred under Maryland law,
due to that state's three-year statute of limitations. Md Cts & Jud Proc Code Ann § 5-101
(1995).
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Weighing the relevant policies of the states involved also
does not point clearly to one state. Vermont's pro-plaintiff fraud
laws presumably reflect a strong interest in protecting Vermont
fraud victims, but Wisconsin's pro-defendant fraud laws reflect
an equally strong interest in preventing unjust fraud prosecu-
tions of Wisconsin citizens. °° The protection of justified expec-
tations also does not determine the answer, since neither party
had reason to know in which state the other lived. Furthermore,
they probably did not know of their "presence" in Maryland.'0 '
This approach cannot provide certainty and predictability either,
given that Internet users meet parties from unknown states with
great frequency. In the end, the ambiguous results of the Section
Six analysis neither add to nor detract from the Section 148
finding that Vermont's laws should control.
Seller's suit therefore should succeed. While this outcome is
not easily predictable, it seems reasonably just. Seller can recov-
er for the injury Expert carelessly caused. The result also seems
to arise for the right reason: the court must consider all the rele-
vant factors, including predictability, the parties' expectations,
the physical location of their contact, their domiciles, the policies
and interests of the states involved, the needs of the interstate
system, and any other important factors.0 2 Here, the choice of
Vermont's law results not from an arbitrary default rule, but
from a careful balancing of all relevant considerations regarding
"o Because no citizens of Maryland, Nebraska, or New York are parties to the suit,
those states do not have strong policy interests in the hypothetical case.
"01 New York was even less within the parties' expectations than the other four states.
If the parties had any justified expectations at all, they probably were limited to the
acceptable use policy ('AUP") that controls the newsgroup. See Cavazos and Morin,
Cyberspace and the Law: Your Rights and Duties in the On-line World 44-45 (MIT Press,
1994) (cited in note 3). For this hypothetical, however, the assumption is that no AUP
exists, or, if it does, that it says nothing about fraud.
The Restatement (Second) comments that "it would be unfair and improper to hold a
person liable under the local law of one state when he had justifiably molded his conduct
to conform to the requirements of another state." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 6 comment g. This would indicate that Expert, believing under Wisconsin law that
he cannot be held liable for fraud as long as he does not deliberately lie, should not have
to submit to Vermont's lower mens rea requirement. An equally strong argument, howev-
er, can be made the other way: Seller, depending on Vermont's fraud law to protect him
from almost all false statements, should not be frustrated by Wisconsin's high mens rea
requirement.
At any rate, the Restatement (Second) holds that parties have no justified expecta-
tions when they act without thinking of the possible legal consequences. Id. This would
probably mean that neither Seller nor Expert have justified expectations in the hypotheti-
cal.
102 See notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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fairness, efficiency, conflicting needs, and appropriate legal prin-
ciples. In part because of its comprehensiveness, the "most-signif-
icant-relationship" test has become increasingly popular and now
represents the plurality rule, followed by twenty-two states.0 3
Nonetheless, scholars have not hesitated to criticize the Re-
statement (Second) as a chaotic jumble of eclectic approaches."'
An unwieldy aggregation such as this presents serious disadvan-
tages. It may be time consuming or cumbersome to apply."5 It
may give the judge excessive freedom by allowing her to choose
among so many criteria in deciding the case; as such, the Re-
statement (Second) may act as a shield for judicial bias and dis-
courage judicial candor.' 6 The other methods do not offer
immunity from judicial bias, but their more focused and bright-
line approaches presumably are more resistant to such influence.
10" Symeonides, 42 Am J Comp L at 609-10 (cited in note 54); updated by Symeonides,
43 Am J Comp L 1 (cited in note 54). This is eight more than the fourteen states observed
following the Restatement (Second) in 1983. Kay, Theory into Practice, 34 Mercer L Rev at
586 n 399 (cited in note 53). The twenty-two states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
and Washington. See Ehredt v DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, 705 P2d 446, 453
(Alaska 1985); Bryant v Silverman, 146 Ariz 41, 703 P2d 1190, 1191 (1985); First Natl
Bank in Fort Collins v Rostek, 182 Colo 437, 514 P2d 314, 320 (1973); O'Connor v
O'Connor, 201 Conn 632, 519 A2d 13, 21-22 (1986) ("most significant relationship" rule
applied only when lex loci produces an arbitrary or irrational result); Travelers Indemnity
v Lake, 594 A2d 38, 47 (Del 1991); Bishop v Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 S2d 999,
1001 (Fla 1980); Johnson v Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 700 P2d 19, 21-22 (1985); Ingersoll v
Klein, 46 Ill 2d 42, 262 NE2d 593, 596 (1970); Hubbard Manufacturing v Greeson, 515
NE2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind 1987) ("most significant relationship" rule applied only when the
place of the tort (under lex loci) is an insignificant contact); Fuerste v Bemis, 156 NW2d
831, 833 (Iowa 1968); Lee v Ford Motor Co., 457 S2d 193, 194 (La Ct App 1984); Adams v
Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A2d 932, 934 (Me 1982); Pevoski v Pevoski, 371 Mass 358, 358
NE2d 416, 417 (1976) (lex loci applies unless another state has a more substantial inter-
est); Mitchell v Craft, 211 S2d 509, 512 (Miss 1968) (lex loci applies unless another state
has a more significant relationship); Kennedy v Dixon, 439 SW2d 173, 184 (Mo 1969);
Harper v Silva, 224 Neb 645, 399 NW2d 826, 828 (1987); Morgan v Biro Manufacturing,
15 Ohio St 3d 339, 474 NE2d 286, 288-89 (1984); Brickner v Gooden, 525 P2d 632, 637
(Okla 1974); Casey v Manson Construction & Engineering Co., 247 Or 274, 428 P2d 898,
904-05 (1967); Hataway v McKinley, 830 SW2d 53, 59 (Tenn 1992); Gutierrez v Collins,
583 SW2d 312, 318 (Tex 1979); Johnson v Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash 2d 577, 555 P2d
997, 1000 (1976).
There may actually be a twenty-third state following the Restatement (Second). The
language of the Nevada Supreme Court in Hermanson v Hermanson, 1994 WL 713121
(Nev 1994) may have indicated a switch to the Restatement (Second) for tort choice-of-law
questions. See note 54.
104 See, for example, Juenger, Choice of Law at 105-06, 142-43 (cited in note 1).
Indeed, this Comment's application of the Restatement (Second) to the hypothetical
is much more cumbersome than the applications of the other tests. See notes 40-44, 59-61,
72-74, 82-84, and 92-101, with accompanying text.
10" Juenger, Choice of Law at 149-50 (cited in note 1).
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Such fairness and efficiency concerns deserve full consider-
ation, but do not defeat the most-significant-relationship test. Its
greatest advantage lies in its capacity to find the right outcome
in a wide range of cases;. 7 by including parts of lex loci,'°8 lex
fori, °9 governmental-interest analysis,"0 and choice-influenc-
ing considerations,"' the Restatement (Second) retains the flex-
ibility to follow those approaches whenever they would generate
the best answer. In other words, its significant decrease in error
costs is potentially large enough to outweigh its admitted in-
crease in decision costs."'
There are reasons to expect this approach to have real ad-
vantages in cyberspace. Historically, significant advances in tele-
communications and mobility have led to more cases involving
multiple states in complex fact patterns. Faced with these cases,
many courts have sought increased flexibility in choice-of-law
rules and therefore have adopted the Restatement (Second)."'
'07 Juenger writes that the Restatement (Second) reflects "the American judiciary's ten-
dency to look for sound results irrespective of doctrinal niceties." Juenger, Choice of Law
at 142 (cited in note 1).
"o' The Restatement (Second) initially directs the court to consider where the injury
occurred; only if another state has a more significant relationship should the court move
away from lex loci. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 145(2)(a) (1971).
'" See factor (b) of the Restatement (Second) § 6(2) (note 91 and accompanying text),
which emphasizes the importance of the forum state's policy interests. Factor (g) also fa-
vors the forum state since forum law will normally be the easiest to apply. Id.
11' See factors (b) and (c) of the Restatement (Second) § 6(2) (note 91 and accompany-
ing text), which roughly correspond to the governmental interests identified in Currie's
test (notes 67-68 and accompanying text).
. See factors (a), (b), (e), (f), and (g) of the Restatement (Second) § 6(2) (note 91 and
accompanying text), which roughly correspond to factors (2), (4), (5), (1), and (3) (respec-
tively) of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations (note 79 and accompanying text).
112 "Error costs" here means the likelihood and severity of making the wrong decision
in a given case. "Decision costs" means the time and effort for the judiciary of applying
the Restatement (Second) test to a given case. Judicial trends strongly suggest that the
Restatement (Second)'s decreased error costs outweigh its higher decision costs: many
states have switched from the bright-line lex loci test to the Restatement (Second) test,
while no states have discarded the Restatement (Second) for a lower decision-cost alterna-
tive. It seems implausible. that courts naturally gravitate toward the most inefficient
approach, so we may assume that their adoption of the Restatement (Second) implies that
its lower error costs justify its higher decision costs.
113 See, for example, Rostek, 514 P2d at 318 (stating that "accidents occurring in
states not the domicile of all the parties are commonplace in today's society. The law
should not deal with them as if they were rare and exotic hypotheticals . . . ."); Travelers,
594 A2d at 44 (stating "the vested rights theory [underlying lex loci], with its emphasis on
territorial boundaries, had little relevance in the modern industrial world... 'boundaries
are of less significance today by reason of the increased mobility of our population and of
the increasing tendency of men to conduct their affairs across boundary lines.'" (quoting
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ch 7 at 413 (Introductory note))); Kennedy
439 SW2d at 182-84 (listing instances of travel-related cases where applying the Re-
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Implicit in that decision is an assessment that the decreased
error costs outweighed the increased decision costs. 4 This
makes intuitive sense: complex scenarios usually require in-
creased freedom of decision to arrive at the right answers, and
the right answer seems more important than a simple and quick
decision."'
If increased flexibility usually offers the best means for ad-
dressing greater complexity, this argument becomes even stron-
ger in the realm of cyberspace. Cyberspace likely will lead to
considerably more complex interstate fact patterns than the earli-
er transportation and communications advances that have en-
couraged the switch to the Restatement (Second) test. Just as it
became easier to fly to an office in a far-away state than it had
been to ride a horse and buggy there, so too will it become easier
to visit that office electronically (through the World Wide Web,
for example, or by e-mail) than to fly there. Indeed, it may be-
come easier than writing a letter or using the telephone. Similar-
ly, an individual is much more likely to encounter people from
foreign jurisdictions on newsgroups and Internet Relay Chat than
on the streets or in the cafes of one's home town. It will be easier
to make an offer available in a multitude of states, or to post a
statement in many states, than to do likewise via the mails,
telephone, or facsimile machines. The argument therefore be-
comes one of degree-interstate interactions occur with a signifi-
cantly greater degree .of frequency and ease (and, as an exten-
sion, greater complexity) in this new medium. Such changes
mirror the very circumstances that made states seek maximum
flexibilty before; that flexibility presumably works, since no state
has abandoned the Restatement (Second) to return to a more
rigid approach. It would be unwise, therefore, to jettison this
flexibility in an area of law that seems likely to require even
more flexibility.
statement (Second) seemed to make the most sense).
"' For example, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the flexibility of the Re-
statement (Second) overcame the "stable and objective standard" of lex loci in Bishop, 389
S2d at 1000-01.
"' To paraphrase the Supreme Court of Illinois, if the main objective is to have a rule
that promotes predictability of outcome and ease of application, the solution would be to
always apply Alaska's law (since it is our nation's largest and coldest state) in every case,
regardless of the fact pattern-courts would effortlessly know which law to apply, and all
parties would know with perfect certainty which law would control. Ingersoll, 262 NE2d
at 595.
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III. OTHER APPROACHES
Some scholars have advanced proposals that would solve
choice-of-law problems at a more fundamental level, eliminating
the need for any choice in the first place.11 This approach
would provide a more satisfactory result than the Restatement
(Second), because, by preventing problems, it obviates the need
for solutions. If only one set of laws applied to cyberspace con-
flicts, all the difficulties concerning party expectations, inconsis-
tent outcomes, forum shopping, and conflicting state policies
would disappear.
A. Federal Common Law for Cyberspace
Federal law is the one set of laws that every state and terri-
tory shares in common. The consistent application of a federal
common law to cyberfraud, or to any cybercrime, would have
numerous advantages."7
Federal judges would save time because they would not need
to determine which state's law applies. Parties to cyberspace
interactions would know in advance that federal law controls
their activities, so their expectations would be satisfied. Plaintiffs
would not have any incentive to shop among various state courts,
and any conflicts arising from inconsistent choice-of-law decisions
would vanish.'18
Nonetheless, this approach suffers from a severe flaw be-
cause it probably violates the Erie doctrine.' Erie states: "Ex-
cept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.... There is no federal general common law."2 ' Congress
16 See notes 117-118, 124-135, 144-46, and 149 and accompanying text.
'11 For a more complete discussion of a federal common-law solution to cyberspace
crimes, see Comment, Let the Chips Fall Where They May: Choice of Law in Computer
Bulletin Board Defamation Cases, 26 UC Davis L Rev 1045, 1066-76 (1993). While that
comment focuses on defamation cases, many of its points have general applicability and
could hold for any form of cyberspace crime.
..8 At least one scholar has found an additional ground for supporting the develop-
ment of a federal common law, at least in complex multistate torts, arguing that a federal
common law approach would be of a higher quality than state law. Friedrich K, Juenger,
The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 La L Rev 907, 921-24 (1994)
(cited in note 2) (referring to the "vagaries" of state law that have "reached new lows" in
recent decades).
"' Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938).
120 Id at 78. Erie applies when a case is in federal court for diversity reasons, as this
hypothetical would be.
Some scholars feel that Erie should not apply whenever a case involves a "uniquely
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has never passed a law directing the federal courts to develop a
common fraud law or a common law for cyberspace; the Constitu-
tion also does not speak to either issue. 1' Consequently, Erie
appears to forbid the development of a cyberspace federal com-
mon law.'22
Even aside from the Erie problem, the creation of a federal
common law for cyberspace remains unsatisfying because of its
national limitation. Using federal law would eliminate conflicts
among the laws of several American states, but would fail to
resolve any similar conflicts among several nations. 2 3 Due to
doctrinal and practical reasons, therefore, a federal common law
for cyberspace would not provide a satisfactory solution.
federal interest". See Comment, 26 UC Davis L Rev at 1072-73 (cited in note 117);
Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law Rules, 54 La L
Rev 907, 921-23 (1994) (cited in note 2). Both derive their idea from Georgene M. Vairo,
Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal
Common Law?, 54 Fordham L Rev 167, 174-84 (1985). Their approach would add a
"uniquely federal interest" category to the two categories listed in Erie (constitutional or
congressional grants of common-law-making power), but this view does not find support in
the Constitution. Juenger. argues that the Founding Fathers lacked the necessary fore-
sight to grant federal courts common-law making power for complex multistate torts, but
if only they had had the foresight, they surely would have agreed. Juenger, The Complex
Litigation Project, 54 La L Rev at 920 (cited in note 118) (referring to the Constitution's
grant of federal common-law authority for maritime and admiralty cases, but the federal
courts' refusal to recognize a similar grant in airline cases: "the perceived need for a
uniform national law is no less pressing in aerial than in aquatic disasters."). While such
arguments surely have some substantive merit, they amount to an open call for a repeal
of, or at least a severe curtailment of, Erie. Such constitutional questions are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
121 If Congress were to pass a statute calling for the creation of a federal common law
for all conflicts arising from cyberspace interactions, the Erie problem would disappear.
Such a statute might pass constitutional muster, since most cyberspace interactions pass
state boundaries and thus come under the Commerce Clause. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
Even interactions that are not strictly "commerce" may be covered because any interstate
communications can be said to have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.
Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 129 (1942).
122 Scholars have noted that federal common law does exist in certain areas, such as
admiralty law. Comment, 26 UC Davis L Rev at 1073 (cited in note 117); Friedrich K.
Juenger, 54 La L Rev at 920 (cited in note 2). Such an analysis misses the point, however,
because those areas of federal common law are authorized either by constitutional grant
or by specific federal statutes. Moreover, isolated and heavily-criticized mass-tort cases
like In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Legislation, 580 F Supp 690 (ED NY 1984),
which appear to run counter to Erie, hardly justify a conclusion that federal courts can
invent a new area of federal common law for cyberspace. Indeed, the Complex Litigation
Project of the American Law Institute has explicitly rejected the Agent Orange "national
consensus" approach on grounds of federalism and state interests. Juenger, 54 La L Rev
at 908 (cited in note 2).
12 In contrast, proposals for a separate cyberlaw would probably succeed at resolving
international conflicts. See notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
462 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
B. Creation of a Separate Cyberlaw
Some proposals reach even further, envisioning the creation
of a separate and legally binding law peculiar to cyberspace.
Such a development would boast the same advantage as the
application of federal law-namely, it would eliminate the need
for difficult choices among several sets of laws. Furthermore, a
separate cyberlaw might prove even more appropriate because
cyberspace has assumed many of the characteristics of a physical
place. Millions of users interact "in" cyberspace and have "ad-
dresses" there.124 Cyberspace also has developed a distinct cul-
ture, and its jargon has evolved to the point of a quasi-lan-
guage.125 A separate cyberlaw, therefore, conforms most closely
with the notion of cyberspace as a place unto itself. The appeal of
a separate cyberlaw has not escaped the attention of legal schol-
ars, who have seen several ways to create it.
1. Customary cyberlaw.
Because of its decentralized, laissez-faire development,
cyberspace has won comparisons to the old American West.126
As in the West, a "pioneer" spirit shaped the early development
of cyberspace. 27 That spirit still dominates cyberspace, even if
the original pioneers now form a small minority of all users.'28
The existence of this common culture and sense of purpose has
helped regulate affairs in cyberspace.'29 This "cyberian ethic"
relies on a common understanding about acceptable behavior,
and policing has occurred at the local level. 3 ° Some scholars
feel this customary cyberlaw can provide the basis of a more fully
developed cyberlaw.' 3 ' Thus, in the coin hypothetical, the feder-
al court in Burlington would apply customary cyberlaw instead of
a specific state law.
The concept of customary law is familiar to legal scholars. It
has formed a key part of international law for many years.'32 In
124 See note 3 and accompanying text.
125 Some users have borrowed the name of a real location to dub their ethereal place
"Cyberia." See Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling
Behavior in Cyberspace through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimet J 1, 8-10 (Fall
1994). For an apt description of cyberspace as a separate "place," see Durme. Id.
126 Dunne, Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimet J at 10 (cited in note 125).
127 Robin C. Widdison, post to NEWJURIS Cyberlaw conference, September 21, 1993.
128 Dunne, 35 Jurimet J at 10 (cited in note 125).
129 Id at 11.
130 Id at 12.
131 Cleveland Thornton, post to NEWJURIS Cyberlaw conference, September 20, 1993.
132 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38 (1)(b) (June 26 1945), ex-
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that context, the repeated actions of nations, the views of emi-
nent international law scholars, and the texts of nonbinding
statements can become customary legal precedent and thus
binding in international courts. Also, American courts often look
to customary practices of an industry as persuasive, but not con-
clusive, authority in particular cases.'33
An important principle therefore emerges: "practices devel-
oped by parties themselves can eventually rise to the level of
enforceable, that is, judicially recognizable, rules of behavior
without ever being codified by a legislative body.""34 Cyberlaw
could therefore evolve from customary precedents. Federal courts
could enforce common Internet practice as cyberlaw, or "courts"
in cyberspace could adopt it.
135
Nonetheless, the adoption of customary cyberlaw has several
potential drawbacks.' First, unlike international law or indus-
try, the membership of cyberspace does not remain stable or
constant. Rather, its ranks swell dramatically each year, with
perhaps millions of new users annually. 37 Attempts to define
cyberspace's customs today may thus unfairly deny tomorrow's
newcomers a chance to influnce the evolution of the
"cyberethic."13' Even apart from equitable considerations, a
snapshot of today's cyberspace customs may prove inaccurate,
fading quickly as newcomers with different customs soon consti-
tute a majority. 13 In other words, cyberspace custom may not
cerpted in Louis Henkin, et al, Basic Documents Supplement to International Law 129
(West, 3d ed 1993).
"' As just one example, see Bimberg v Northern Pacific Railway, 217 Minn 187, 14
NW2d 410, 413 (1944) ("Local usage and general custom... will not justify or excuse neg-
ligence. They are merely foxholes in one of the battlefields of law, providing shelter but
not complete protection ....")..
"I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U Pitt L Rev 993,
1024 (1994).
.. See notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
" One such drawback, discussed more fully at notes 147-48, is that parties may ask
the court to interpret what cyberspace's customary law really is. In that case, the court
would need to apply the interpretive canons of one jurisdiction or another, thereby return-
ing to the choice-of-law difficulties enumerated earlier.
"3 See note 3.
'3 This drawback holds true whenever newcomers join a society that has rules and is
to some degree inevitable. Normally, it does not pose great equitable difficulties because
the number of newcomers is a fraction of the total society. Where the newcomers form a
significant proportion of the society, however, and begin to constitute a majority, equity
concerns necessarily increase.
'" Dunne agrees, stating that "Cyberia has outgrown its legal system [of customary
law]." Dunne, 35 Jurimet J at 15 (cited in note 125).
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have achieved the stability necessary to provide useful or desir-
able legal precedent.
A second concern arises from the sheer number of cyberspace
"inhabitants." The denizens of cyberspace outnumber the actors
in international relations, and in most industries, by at least a
thousandfold. Almost five million computers connect to the
Internet alone;4 ' some scholars have advanced an estimate of
around twenty million Internet users, with an even larger num-
ber in cyberspace.'4 ' To speak of "customs" shared by twenty
million people may verge on fiction.' Even if a coherent set of
customs exists, courts may find it too difficult to obtain enough
evidence to glean a meaningful picture of the custom in ques-
tion.'4
2. Contractual cyberlaw.
Because customary cyberlaw may prove too unstable or nebu-
lous for judicial purposes, some scholars have advocated a con-
tractual model for cyberlaw.'" Such an approach would address
at least some of the problems with customary cyberlaw. The
contract's language would supply the certainty and specificity
lacking when customary law is in flux. Furthermore, the contract
could serve as a condition for entry to cyberspace. Therefore, any
user in cyberspace will have consented to its terms, and a univer-
sal understanding will exist where none would emerge via cus-
tomary cyberlaw alone.
One could easily imagine such a contract. A "model code" of
cyberspace conduct, specifying offenses and penalties, would
provide the substantive part of the contract.' Sites and provid-
1,0 Christopher Anderson, The Accidental Superhighway, 336 The Economist 3 (July 1,
1995).
" Id. Also see Dunne, 35 Jurimet J at 3 (citing the estimate of Philip Elmer-Dewitt,
First Nation in Cyberspace, Time 62 (Dec 6, 1993)).
142 Dunne, Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimet J at 11 ("Indeed, in a community of 20
million there probably is no such thing as a common understanding."). See also John
Dale, post to NEWJURIS Cyberlaw conference, September 24, 1993 (stating that the
different areas of cyberspace already have sharply divergent principles of etiquette).
" The whole point may be moot anyway. Judge Richard Posner has suggested that
courts tend to pay less attention to custom when the parties have no contractual relation-
ship. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 229-45 (Little, Brown and Co., 3d ed
1986).
'" Dunne, 35 Jurimet J at 1 (cited in note 125); Lance Rose, post to NEWJURIS
Cyberlaw conference, September 24, 1993.
" The concept of a model code, as well as the other details of the contractual
cyberlaw system posited here, are based on the ambitious proposal outlined in Dunne, 35
Jurimet J at 13-15 (cited in note 125).
4371 CHOICE OF LAW IN CYBERFRAUD
ers that adopt the code would restrict or refuse access for users
logging on from sites and providers that have not adopted the
code. All participating sites and providers would require users to
agree to the contract before signing on. Local system operators
would enforce the contract by restricting or eliminating the ac-
cess of users who violate its terms. " This would encourage a
universally shared set of rules in cyberspace that the federal
court in Burlington could enforce in the coin hypothetical.
Like customary cyberlaw, however, this approach suffers
from certain shortcomings.1 7 Its major drawback lies in the in-
4f Given cyberspace's decentralized nature, no one authority could impose such a
contractual approach from above. Instead, a gradual bottom-up method must provide the
avenue for voluntary adoption. Dunne suggests targeting educational institutions, which
comprise nearly one quarter of all Internet hosts, as catalysts by asking them to adopt the
contract first. Id at 13.
'7 One fairness concern relates to the question of who would draft the code and con-
tract defining cyberspace offenses and penalties. It would be impossible to seek input and
approval from all cyberspace users, so scholars have advocated a more sensible and
manageable approach: assemble a task force or committee to develop the code of
cyberspace conduct. Hardy, 55 U Pitt L Rev at 1037 (cited in note 134). The inequity in
such an approach stems from the fact that the law for several key cyberspace issues
would be written by a group of unelected scholars. Some such delegation seems inevitable,
however, given the impossibility of holding binding referenda throughout cyberspace on
all relevant issues. Furthermore, the drafters could mitigate this inequity a great deal by
seeking wide input from cyberspace users. Id.
One might also wonder whether the imposition of such a cyberspace contract would
amount to an adhesion contract. The contract's effectiveness depends on adoption by a
critical number of sites whose endorsement would lead to broad adoption by other sites.
See discussion in Dunne, 35 Jurimet J at 13. Should it achieve such widespread adoption,
users could find their access to cyberspace severely curtailed. Indeed, sites and providers
might categorically refuse requests to alter the contract's terms because doing so would
jeopardize their access to all other systems and providers. This would effectively eliminate
what little bargaining power users might have had. Courts might look very unfavorably
on the unilateral imposition of contract terms where one party has no power to bargain.
Furthermore, as cyberspace becomes increasingly important for business and commu-
nications purposes, courts may find heavy-handed contract imposition even more intolera-
ble. The entire endeavor might become illegal as an adhesion contract if it achieves
domination.
While such a lack of choice causes legitimate concerns, it probably does not rise to
the level of unconscionability. "Unconscionability .... [includes] an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreason-
ably favorable to the other party." Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445,
449 (DC Cir 1965). The "absence of meaningful choice" would probably apply if cyberspace
becomes as essential to daily life as, for example, the telephone. The second element,
however-"contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party"-is
probably lacking. The sites and providers presumably restrict access for fear of losing
important connections to other sites, not to victimize users. The fear of losing access to
important sites would probably qualify as "reasonable" in most courts, thus avoiding the
unreasonability requirement. Another, more traditional, definition of an unconscionable
agreement defines it as one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would
make on the one hand, and no honest or fair man would accept, on the other." Greer v
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herent incompleteness of all contracts: no fixed agreement can
foresee all conflicts among parties, especially when the parties
number in the millions. The contract surely would cover certain
topics inherently relevant to cyberspace, such as copyright in-
fringement, encryption, pornography, and privacy issues. Com-
mon-law fraud, however, probably would not leap to the drafters'
minds. Indeed, any cyberspace contract likely would fail to ad-
dress a whole host of illegal activities, thus providing no guid-
ance in many areas. As a result, the parties would still need to
resort to the laws of the "real world," thereby wrestling with the
very choice-of-law conflicts the contract approach had hoped to
eliminate."
Even in the unlikely event that a contract managed to cover
all major crimes, torts, and other illegal activity that might occur
in cyberspace, the need for a choice-of-law approach might re-
main. Contractual language, even when relatively on point, often
must undergo judicial interpretation to settle disputes about the
interstices. In such a case, it will matter which state's interpre-
tive rules apply to the cyberspace contract, so the choice-of-law
question recurs.
3. Cyberlaw courts.
The ultimate manifestation of the separate cyberlaw ap-
proach immerses the entire judicial process in the cyberlaw
realm. The preceding discussions of customary law and contract
approaches envisioned enforcement by the federal court in
Burlington. The need for ultimate recourse to a "real world" court
in those cases brought back the troublesome choice-of-law ques-
tions that a separate cyberspace law sought to avoid. The cre-
ation of a separate judicial system in cyberspace would solve that
problem. These cyberlaw courts would hear individual cases,
meting out justice according to cyberlaw principles.149 By draw-
ing entirely on cyberlaw, even for interpretation of the interstic-
Tweed, 13 Abb Pr (NS) 427, 429 (NYCP 1872) (quoting Judge Story, 1 Story Eq Jur,
§ 188), as cited in Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F2d at 450 n12. The cyberspace con-
tract, based on a code of appropriate conduct, would probably not contain such gross
inequities as to match this second definition.
Not all scholars propose a contract paradigm solely for the purpose of avoiding
choice-of-law questions, of course, but that is the relevant goal for this Comment's hypo-
thetical.
' These cyberlaw principles could stem from customary cyberlaw (see notes 126-43
and accompanying text), contractual cyberlaw (see notes 144-48 and accompanying text),
or from some other source of cyberlaw that this Comment does not envisage.
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es, these cyberlaw courts would provide a purely cyberlaw solu-
tion.
Disadvantages remain, however. The lack of democratic
accountability of a cyberspace court represents one fundamental
shortcoming. Judges in the "real world" must either face election
themselves, or be appointed by officials who face election. 50 In
cyberspace, on the other hand, no such democratic checks appear
to exist. Holding a fair and binding election in cyberspace would
prove impractical if not impossible.'5 '
More importantly, cyberspace courts would enjoy only a
small range of remedies. Unless cyberspace users agreed to place
their worldly belongings under the binding control of the
cyberspace courts-a most unlikely scenario--cyberspace courts
would have power only over cyberspace. They could restrict or
eliminate the offender's access to areas of cyberspace. They could
not, however, force the offender to pay anyone anything, to relin-
quish possession of any real world object, or to perform any ac-
tion in the real world. Consequently, in cases where one party
has suffered financial loss, such as the coin hypothetical,
cybercourts would prove powerless to order an effective remedy.
This criticism may well lose force in the future. If cyberspace
continues to expand, people may find it more convenient to route
their financial dealings through cyberspace, make a Web site
their primary place of business, or rely on computer-mediated
communication as their primary connection to the world. The
more people live their lives in cyberspace, the more real power
cybercourts will have.
For the near future, however, the advantage of totally elimi-
nating choice-of-law questions comes at a great cost. By avoiding
real world courts entirely, the parties also forego the police power
of the state that makes real world court decisions enforceable. A
cybercourt proponent might argue that the solution lies in a
binding agreement, enforceable in real world courts, to obey
whatever verdict the cyberspace court hands down. This would
resemble the binding effect of arbitration agreements, which
courts routinely enforce. Such an approach, however, differs little
from the contractual paradigm discussed above, and suffers from
,50 US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2, and Art III, § 1 outline the appointment process and
tenure of federal judges.
15' One major difficulty, for example, would lie in limiting each user to one vote. Users
can easily have multiple addresses in cyberspace and thus vote multiple times. Moreover,
savvy users would likely encounter little trouble voting several times even from the same
address.
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the same weaknesses.'52 Once the parties sign agreements with
real-world implications, courts will use real-world law to inter-
pret the agreements and the choice-of-law specter returns.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing hypothetical demonstrates the results of vari-
ous choice-of-law approaches to a complex cyberfraud case. The
extreme ease of interstate communication and dealing makes
cyberfraud cases complex, and this complexity exposes the disad-
vantage of a rigid and mechanical rule like lex loci. It also high-
lights the potential weaknesses of the governmental interest
analysis and the choice-influencing considerations approach: each
supplies needed flexibility over lex loci, but also reverts too easily
to a default rule favoring the forum state.153 As cases become
increasingly complex, the wisest choice will favor desirable re-
sults over discrete and simple rules. Maximum flexibility can
best meet the challenges presented by increasingly difficult fact
patterns. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides
more flexibility than either Professor Currie's or Professor
Leflar's approaches because it allows the decision maker to weigh
all of their elements and others too. This approach, while cum-
bersome, seems most capable of providing appropriate outcomes.
More ambitious solutions might eliminate the choice-of-law
difficulties altogether by imposing a single legal regime on
cyberspace conflicts. Fully satisfactory models have yet to
emerge, however. The judicial creation of a federal common law
for cyberspace would violate the Erie doctrine. The creation of a
separate cyberspace law would avoid that difficulty, but it re-
mains unclear whether a customary cyberlaw approach would
provide a sufficiently stable and equitable answer. Contractual
paradigms may appear to work, but will succumb to the same
choice-of-law difficulties in the end. The use of cyberspace courts
offers the surest way to avoid choice-of-law questions, but it
would also lead to unenforceable or weak solutions in many cas-
es.
The most effective approach to complex cyberfraud cases,
therefore, lies in the Restatement (Second) approach to conflicts
of law. That approach allows the court to consider all relevant
152 See notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
"5 This favoring of the forum state is explicit in the governmental interest analysis,
and implicit in the choice-influencing considerations method.
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factors, weigh them, and choose the most sensible result. While
the most-significant-relationship test can become cumbersome
and impose high decision costs, it enjoys greater flexibility for
finding the right answer, a key criterion for conflicts arising in
cyberspace.

